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Background: Risk assessment is widely used to improve patient safety, but healthcare workers are not trained to 
design robust solutions to the risks they uncover.  This leads to an overreliance on the weakest category of risk 
control recommendations: administrative controls.  Increasing the proportion of non-administrative risk control 
options (NARCOs) generated would enable (though not ensure) the adoption of more robust solutions.   
 
Objectives: Experimentally assess a method for generating stronger risk controls: The Generating Options for 
Active Risk Control (GO-ARC) Technique.   
 
Methods: Participants generated risk control options in response to two patient safety scenarios.  Scenario 1 
(baseline): All participants used current practice (unstructured brainstorming).  Scenario 2: Control group used 
current practice; intervention group used the GO-ARC Technique.  To control for individual differences between 
participants, analysis focused on the change in the proportion of NARCOs for each group.   
 
Results: Control group: Proportion of NARCOs decreased from 0.18 at baseline to 0.12. Intervention group: 
Proportion increased from 0.10 at baseline to 0.29 using the GO-ARC Technique.  Results were statistically 
significant.  There was no decrease in the number of administrative controls generated by the intervention group.  
  
Conclusion: The Generating Options for Active Risk Control (GO-ARC) Technique appears to lead to more robust 
risk control options. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Healthcare organizations in many countries have adopted operational risk management tools 
such as root cause analysis (RCA),[1–5] failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA),[6–8] and –to 
a lesser extent— other such techniques[8–12] to address the systems-level determinants of 
patient safety.  One key feature of these approaches is that they are exclusively focused on 
problem exploration (risk assessment).  They provide no direct support for the process of 
translating this problem-focused learning into solutions-focused interventions (risk 
control).[2,9,13,14]   
 
The unexamined assumption behind this state of affairs is that successful risk assessment will 
necessarily lead to successful risk control.  This approach may be successful in the industrial 
settings where these techniques were developed (the chemical process industry, for 
instance[15]), but recent evidence suggests that this success does not extend to the fields of 
healthcare[2] or occupational health and safety.[16] This may reflect that fact that the tools of 
operational risk assessment were created both by and for engineers, who are specifically trained 
to develop high-quality, robust solutions in response to identified requirements.[17] Healthcare 
workers are not trained in these skills,[18] nor are they supported by risk management policies 
and procedures that provide adequate support for this function.[14] As a result, they face 
significant challenges in generating (and recognizing) high-quality risk controls.[2,19,20] 
 
The strength of risk controls can be assessed using the three-tiered hierarchy of risk control.[2] 
The most effective and robust (i.e., prone to continue working over time) category is Elimination 
of the Hazard or the Target.  The intermediate level is made up of Design Controls (aka 
Engineering Controls[16]), interventions like physical barriers, forcing functions, equipment or 
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location changes, etc., that do not rely on people to do the right thing.  The weakest category is 
made up of Administrative Controls, which do rely on people to do the right thing (e.g., training, 
policies and procedures, and alarms). Current practice relies overwhelmingly on this least robust 
category.   
 
James Bagian, a pioneer in the application of operational risk assessment techniques to 
healthcare, has demonstrated the fallibility of administrative controls.  In an analysis of Joint 
Commission survey data comparing different types of risk controls under both announced and 
unannounced inspections, he found that there was essentially no difference in compliance rates 
for “engineering changes” (i.e., design controls) between announced and unannounced 
inspections.  But compliance rates for administrative controls were much lower during 
unannounced inspections vs. announced inspections.[18] In short, design controls work 
regardless of whether anyone is watching, while administrative controls may require constant 
monitoring in order to be reliable. 
 
Among published RCAs in healthcare, administrative controls account for ~80% of all risk 
controls recommended or implemented.  In the sub-set of studies describing which risk controls 
has been implemented, 50% resulted exclusively in administrative controls.[2] This may be part 
of the reason why the adoption of RCA, FMEA and other methods has not led to systemic 
improvement in the rate of patient harm.[21] Very similar findings have also been shown in a 
recent analysis of occupational health and safety incident investigations.[16] 
The Generating Options for Active Risk Control (GO-ARC) Technique has been developed as 
one step toward addressing this problem.  It is a structured brainstorming method designed to 
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increase the proportion of non-administrative risk control options considered after a risk 
assessment. The GO-ARC Technique was developed for use as part of the broader Active Risk 
Control (ARC) Toolkit,[22,23] which includes additional tools for assessing the risk control 
options that result.  
The technique could also be used on a stand-alone basis, or in combination with other 
approaches to assessing and selecting risk control options –e.g., the Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team-based approach[19] or the Lovebug Diagram[24]. Unlike the ARC Toolkit, neither of 
these alternate approaches currently includes a component for generating high-quality risk 
control options in the first place.  
Previous literature on the GO-ARC Technique has been limited to one uncontrolled before-and-
after study.[25] This article presents the first experimental assessment of the method, and one of 
very few experimental studies of healthcare risk management techniques in general. 
2 METHODS 
2.1 Hypothesis  
The GO-ARC Technique improves the proportion of non-administrative risk controls generated 
versus current practice. 
2.2 Recruitment  
Participants were recruited through the listserv of the American Society for Healthcare Risk 
Management (ASHRM), relevant LinkedIn groups (e.g., those associated with the National 
Association for Healthcare Quality and the Institute for Health Improvement), and 
Academia.edu.  The posts requested participation from those involved in healthcare risk 
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management / patient safety, and healthcare workers who might be called upon to participate in a 
root cause analysis.  No personally identifying information was collected. 
2.3 Procedure 
The study was conducted using the Qualtrics online survey tool.  In step one, Qualtrics randomly 
assigned participants to either the control group or the intervention group.  Then both groups 
were asked to generate solutions to the same patient safety scenario  (Scenario 1) using current 
practice, i.e., unstructured brainstorming;[26,27] participants were asked to “Please brainstorm 
risk control options (potential risk control action plans) to address the patient safety risk 
described in Scenario 1, below.”  This provided the baseline data required to assess 
improvement.  
 
Participants then generated solutions in response to a second scenario (Scenario 2), which was 
also the same for both groups.  The control group again used current practice.  The intervention 
group received a brief description of the GO-ARC Technique and the hierarchy of risk controls, 
then used the GO-ARC Technique to generate risk control options.  No time limits were 
imposed.  Responses were entered as free text and coded according to the 3-tiered hierarchy of 
risk controls.   
 
To control for individual differences between participants, the analysis focused on the change in 
the proportion of non-administrative risk controls for each group between Scenario 2 and 
baseline (Scenario 1). See Figure 1 for a diagram illustrating the flow of subjects through the 
experiment. 
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2.4 Statistical tests 
Statistical analysis focused on the proportion of non-administrative risk control options 
generated, specifically the change in the difference between control and intervention groups from 
Scenario 1 to Scenario 2.  Given the nature of the responses, a binomial regression model 
examining the number of non-administrative responses out of the total number of responses was 
employed with a standard logit link function.  In addition, a random effect for subject was 
included as part of the model.  This generalized linear model was conducted primarily using the 
glmer function in the R package lme4.[28] 
2.5 The GO-ARC prompts 
Participants randomized into the experimental condition were asked to use a series of five 
brainstorming prompts to generate risk control options in response to the adverse incident 
scenarios.  (See Table 1)  Each prompt is a risk control strategy.  The first three consist of the 3-
tiered hierarchy of risk controls.  The remaining two, detection/situational awareness and 
preparedness help users consider risk controls to reduce the severity of harm or prevent harm in 
the midst of an on-going systems breakdown; they are aimed at promoting resilience[29–31], as 
opposed to focusing solely on preventing systems breakdowns in the first place. This two-
pronged approach is based on the model, widely accepted in the risk management community, of 
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Table 1. The GO-ARC Prompts 
Prompt Definition 
Elimination Eliminate the hazard or the target from the 
system.  This can mean transferring the risk to 
another entity, substituting a less hazardous 
process, material, etc., or discontinuing the 
hazardous process entirely. 
 
Design controls With a focus on physical barriers, isolation, 
forcing functions, human factors, and failsafe 
design, design controls improve safety without 




Policies, procedures, training and other 
controls that depend on people taking the 
correct actions.   
 
Detection /           
situational 
awareness 
These risk controls focus on knowing that 
something is going wrong, or is likely to do so, 
in time to prevent it, or reduce its impact. 
 
Preparedness Preparedness is the state of being ready for 
predictable risks. Risk controls in this category 
involve having a response ready to go if the 
risk occurs.  It means more than having a plan: 
It also means having the resources available 
and ready to be used to implement that plan. 
 
During the structured brainstorming process, the prompts were displayed along with their 
definitions (see Table 1) and illustrative examples.   
2.6 Patient safety scenarios 
The two patient safety scenarios were presented in the form of “5 Whys” analyses,[33] as shown 
in Boxes 1 and 2 below.  The first was a fatal medication error, and the second an inpatient 
suicide.  The 5 Whys approach was chosen not because it is a particularly powerful risk 
assessment technique, but because A) It would be familiar to most healthcare workers who have 
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received any RCA training; B) It allows for a very concise description of the scenario; and C) Its 
chronological approach closely mirrors real-world practice in healthcare RCA, which tends to 
focus on the timeline of a ‘series of unfortunate events,’ rather than the underlying systems 
issues that gave rise to those events.[34]  
Box 1. Scenario 1 
Scenario 1  
Risk: Patient dies of drug overdose  
1. Why: Patient received twice the intended dose of a highly-toxic medication by IV  
2. Why: Medication accidentally added to IV twice  
3. Why: Nurse was interrupted three times by fellow clinicians with requests for information while 
trying to prepare drugs  
4. Why: Nurse to patient ratio was unusually low  
5. Why: Many nurses were out with the flu  
6. Why: Low influenza vaccination rate among healthcare workers at the facility  
Box 2. Scenario 2 
Scenario 2  
Risk: Patient suicide  
1. Why: Patient hung himself from pipes beneath the sink of a public restroom near the dialysis unit  
2. Why: Patient absconded from psychiatric unit  
3. Why: Patient walked out the door of the psychiatric unit right behind a patient transportation 
clerk who was exiting the unit. The patient transportation clerk noticed that the patient was 
leaving; she assumed he was allowed to, because no one from the unit told the patient to stop.  
4. Why: The patient care assistant at the front desk saw the patient leaving, but assumed the patient 
was going with the patient transportation clerk to attend an appointment elsewhere in the hospital  
5. Why: Poor communication between the patient transportation clerk and the patient care assistant, 
both of whom thought the other was responsible for the patient. 
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2.7 Coding responses 
Responses were independently coded by two members of the research team using the three-tiered 
hierarchy of risk controls, and disagreements between the two were resolved by consensus.  A 
third member of the research team was available to adjudicate any disagreements that could not 
be resolved by consensus.  A brief description of each category can be found in Table 1; 
illustrative examples drawn from participant responses are shown in Box 3 below. 
Box 3. Example responses 
Eliminate the hazard or target (Elimination) 
Examples from participant responses: 
Scenario 1:  “All IV admixtures should be compounded/mixed by the pharmacy staff” 
[Transferring the risk to another entity] 
Scenario 2:  “Eliminate psychiatric services from the facility” [Not delivering the hazardous 
service] 
Design Controls 
Examples from participant responses: 
Scenario 1: “Ensure pharmacy cannot fill order twice; block in system for categories of drugs.” 
[Forcing function] 
Scenario 2:  “Design a "holding area" that would cause a patient to get through 2 sets of locked 
doors to get off of the unit.” [Physical barrier] 
Administrative Controls 
Examples from participant responses: 
Scenario 1:  “Highly toxic medications should have 'another set of eyes' before administration, 
e.g 2 nurses review orders, medications, label, documentation.” [Procedure – double-checking] 
Scenario 2:  “Train all staff to ask patient who they are and why they are leaving.” [Training] 
 
Not a Risk Control or Repeated Risk Controls 
Responses that would not directly lead to risk reduction (e.g., general comments, suggestions for further 
risk assessment, etc.) were ignored, as were repeated suggestions of the same risk control by a single 
participant (e.g., proposing a door alarm in response to the design controls prompt and again in response 
to the detection / situational awareness prompt).  
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3 RESULTS 
3.1 Responses  
Seventy-five participants completed the survey; 65 provided usable responses.  Forty-one were 
randomized to the control group, and 24 to the intervention group.  The remaining 10 were 
excluded. Five were excluded because the participants misunderstood the nature of the exercise 
and responded exclusively by identifying risks or with suggestions for further risk assessment. 
Three were excluded because they provided nonsense responses (n = 3).  One participant did not 
feel competent to respond to Scenario 2 due to a lack of familiarity with psychiatric units, and 
one continued responding to Scenario 1 during the Scenario 2 portion of the exercise. 
 
The nonsense responses (e.g., responding “q” to every question) were limited to the GO-ARC 
Technique, which may indicate that these were examples of previous respondents returning to 
review the method.  Because no personally identifying information was collected (e.g., IP 
addresses), however, this cannot be confirmed. A similar number of responses were excluded 
from both groups (5 ± 2). One participant who was included in the analysis gave a mix of usable 
and unusable responses to Scenario 1, but gave only unusable responses to Scenario 2. Figure 1 
illustrates the flow of participants through the experiment. 
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3.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Use of the GO-ARC Technique was associated with the generation of a higher proportion of 
non-administrative risk control options. This was not the result of a reduction in the number of 
administrative risk control options generated using the technique. In fact, use of the GO-ARC 
Technique was associated with the generation of a higher number of risk control options in all 
three categories (elimination, design controls, and administrative controls).  
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As shown in Table 2, the number and distribution of risk controls at Scenario 1 were very similar 
between the intervention group and the control group. At Scenario 2, the proportion of non-
administrative risk controls generated by the control group dropped slightly as did the overall 
number of risk control options generated. In contrast, use of the GO-ARC Technique by the 
intervention group in Scenario 2 was associated with an increase in the counts for all three risk 
control categories, as well as a marked increase in the proportion of non-administrative risk 
controls generated (approximately 3 times higher than baseline).   
 
Table 2. Mean/median number of risk control options generated and proportion of non-administrative controls: category 
by scenario / treatment group 
  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Group Risk control category Mean Median Mean Median 
Control  Elimination 0.39 0 0.07 0 
 Design 0.22 0 0.46 0 
 Administrative 3.71 4 3.44 3 
Intervention Elimination 0.17 0 1.04 1 
 Design 0.25 0 2.08 2 
 Administrative 3.71 3 7.42 7 
Control Prop. non-admin controls 0.18 0.14 0.12 0 




Overall results from the generalized linear mixed model suggest an adequate fit to the data 
( ).  Table 3 displays the fixed effects; there was no significant variation 
among individuals.  The statistically significant interaction might suggest that the treatment 
group difference of experimental versus control increases at scenario two compared to scenario 
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one, but interaction effects in these models can be somewhat difficult to interpret (see, for 
example, references [35–37]).  
   





z value Pr(>|z|) Odds Ratio 
Intercept -1.81 0.22 -8.36 < 0.01 0.16 
Group -0.38 0.40 -0.96 0.34 0.68 
Scenario -0.05 0.31 -0.17 0.87 0.95 
Group by scenario 1.37 0.48 2.87 < 0.01 3.94 
*Reference group for group is the control group; reference group for scenario is Scenario 1 
 
Attention is focused instead on the expected values for each cell, which provides more clearly 
interpretable results.  These are provided in Table 4.  Again, there appears to be no difference 
between treatment groups for scenario one, followed by a noticeable increase in proportion of 
non-administrative responses among the intervention group at scenario two. 
 
Table 4. Expected values for proportion of non-administrative options generated by treatment group and scenario 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Control 0.14   0.13 
Experimental   0.10   0.30 
 
 
These increases did not appear to be the result of learning effects, as evidenced by the lack of 
any significant difference in control group responses between the two scenarios.  Additionally, as 
shown in Table 2, the increase in the proportion of non-administrative controls was 
accomplished without a corresponding decrease in the number of administrative controls 
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generated; indeed, the number of administrative controls was also higher using the GO-ARC 
Technique.   
4 DISCUSSION 
 
If healthcare risk management approaches are to live up to their promise of improving patient 
safety, they will have to result not only in a better understanding of patient safety problems, but 
also in better solutions.  This study provides the first experimental evidence to support the 
transition from current practice, which focuses almost exclusively on risk assessment, toward a 
more balanced approach to risk management.[38] It also addresses a critical lack of evidence to 
guide risk management practice more generally.[39]  
 
The findings of this study lend weight to previous work on the GO-ARC Technique. A before-
and-after study using the Technique suggested that it may increase the quantity, quality, variety, 
and novelty of risk controls generated in response to a patient safety incident.[25] Use of the 
GO-ARC Technique in a real-world case study of the broader ARC Toolkit resulted in the 
generation of 12 risk control options for reducing pressure ulcers in a hospital setting. Seven of 
these (58%) were non-administrative risk controls. The resulting action plan included all seven 
non-administrative control options, along with four of the five administrative controls.[23] The 
experimental study presented here is a significant step forward for the evidence base on the use 
of this method, and strongly suggests that current practice can be improved upon..  
 
It is important to note that generating better risk control options is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
step toward implementing and sustaining better risk controls in practice.  In current practice, risk 
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control implementation rates appear to vary inversely with risk control quality; that is, 
implementation rates are highest for administrative controls and lowest for elimination.[2] Thus, 
the impact of the GO-ARC Technique may be highest when it is paired with tools to assist in 
selecting, implementing, and sustaining the best available options.  These might include the 
Active Risk Control (ARC) Toolkit (of which the GO-ARC Technique is one 
component),[22][23] the Lovebug Diagram,[24]
 
or other approaches of similar scope.[19]
 
 
A user acceptance study of the broader Active Risk Control (ARC) Toolkit, which includes the 
GO-ARC Technique, found that users perceived the Toolkit as useful, valuable, and reasonably 
easy to use.  They felt that the Toolkit improved the quality of the risk control process and led to 
increased confidence in the recommendations they produced.  The cost (free) was felt to be 
acceptable, and most respondents said that they would use the Toolkit again in the same or 
similar circumstances.[22] The GO-ARC Technique and the broader ARC Toolkit are both 
available for free at www.activeriskcontrol.com. 
 
4.1 Limitations 
Although this study presents the highest quality evidence to date on the GO-ARC Technique, it 
is not without limitations.  Most importantly, the head-to-head comparison with current practice 
examined only one patient safety scenario.  Because the level of improvement is certain to vary 
based on the scenario in question, the exact degree of improvement demonstrated cannot be 
generalized from a single comparison.  Additional research will be required to determine the 
range of improvement that can be expected using the technique. 
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In terms of raw counts, there could also be some differences resulting from unmeasured 
attributes of the participants (e.g., profession, years of experience, etc.) which, given the 
relatively small number participants in this study (n = 65), and especially in the intervention 
group (n=24), might not have been fully cancelled out through randomization.  However, the 
study design’s focus on improvement between Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 controls for any such 
variation in the analysis we present.  Further, with regard to the importance of experience, the 
earlier pilot study on the GO-ARC Technique [25] suggests that this tool can lead to significant 
improvement even when used by highly-experienced healthcare risk managers.   
 
Similarly, it is possible that the individual nature of the experimental task might have influenced 
the results in some way. Risk control options generation in healthcare is often, though not 
always, a small group activity.  However, the before-and-after pilot study was conducted in a 
group setting and it achieved very similar results to the experimental study reported here. 
 
Finally, it may be worth reiterating that generating a better pool of risk control options does not 
guarantee that higher quality risk controls will actually be implemented or sustained in practice.  
Not all ‘strong’ risk control options will prove feasible or appropriate,[40] and even when they 
are, it is possible that higher-quality risk control options will be ignored in favor of traditional, 
non-robust approaches like training[41,42] and policy development.[43,44] The GO-ARC 
Technique is likely to be most effective when paired with a systematic approach to analysing and 
evaluating risk control options, as well as managing change.  
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4.2 Balancing the Evidence 
Despite the limitations above, this study represents a significant step forward for evidence-based 
practice in generating options for risk control.  Not only is current practice not actively supported 
by the evidence, but a systematic review of risk control after root cause analysis has shown that 
current practice in healthcare consistently results in poor quality risk control options.[2] Thus, 
while the evidence for the GO-ARC method is limited at this stage, it compares very favorably to 
the (non-existent) evidence in favour of current practice. This inadequate basis for current 





Given the very small time investment required, and the fact that this technique does not appear to 
reduce the number of administrative risk controls generated (i.e., it does not limit the choices 
available to users), the results of this study may be a sufficient basis for recommending the use of 
the GO-ARC Technique in practice. 
 
4.3 Applicability Beyond the Healthcare Domain 
The GO-ARC Technique has been developed specifically to address identified needs in 
healthcare risk management and patient safety improvement, and has not yet been tested in any 
other field.  Additional research will be required to determine whether it can improve upon 
current practice in other risk management domains.  The approach is entirely generic, however, 
so there is no obvious reason why it should not be more broadly applicable.   
 
Because current risk control practice in occupational health and safety appears similar to that in 
healthcare,[16] extending this work to encompass workplace safety would seem the logical next 
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step.  It may also prove valuable in other areas in which risk assessments are conducted by those 
with deep domain expertise, but with limited training in engineering, ergonomics,[48] or other 
design-oriented disciplines (e.g., police involved in a terrorism risk assessment, school 
administrators planning for a communicable disease outbreak, etc.). 
5 CONCLUSION 
The Generating Options for Active Risk Control (GO-ARC) Technique appears to improve the 
quality of risk control options generated in response to a patient safety incident scenario.  In so 
doing, it may enable healthcare workers involved in risk management to make better decisions 
about how to improve patient safety.  Additional research is warranted, to determine both the 
degree of improvement that can be expected across different patient safety scenarios, and the 
degree to which the technique might prove useful in other risk management domains.  
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